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 II.-425 
LICENSE TO SUBLICENSE: THE LEGAL 
POSSIBILITY OF IMPLIEDLY SUBLICENSING 
A COPYRIGHTED WORK 
Abstract: On March 13, 2020, in Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Inc., 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that, within copyright law, an 
implied sublicense is legally possible where a licensee’s nonexclusive license 
permits unrestricted sublicensing. This was an issue of first impression among 
the federal courts of appeals. This Comment argues that the First Circuit correct-
ly concluded that implied sublicenses are legally possible and that the legal test 
for determining whether an implied sublicense exists must consider the relation-
ship between the licensee and sublicensee. Nevertheless, because sublicensing 
necessarily excludes the copyright owner, applying a modified form of the strin-
gent three-element test the court eschewed would serve as a better guide for fu-
ture cases analyzing this issue. This tripartite formula, incorporating request, de-
livery, and intent, creates a framework that would ensure that the intent portrayed 
by the licensee is deliberate and that privity exists between the two parties to the 
sublicensing agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
To protect ownership of original works by creators, Congress enacted the 
Copyright Act of 1976.1 Although the Copyright Act sets forth a detailed regu-
latory framework for enforcing copyrights, gaps remain.2 For example, be-
cause the Act does not provide the elements of an implied sublicense, courts 
have been forced to do so instead.3 In 2020, in Photographic Illustrator’s 
                                                                                                                      
 1 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (codifying protections for copyrighted works); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF., GENERAL  GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 1:1 (1977), https://www.copyright.gov/
reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SL8-RNB5] (explaining that copyright legislation 
has historically sought to reward creators for their creative contributions). The U.S. Constitution 
grants Congress the power to establish federal copyright protections for original works. U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. In copyright law, an original work is any work that an author creates independently 
and possesses at least a minimal amount of creativity. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 345 (1991). As long as the work is not copied, it qualifies as an original—meaning novelty 
is not a requirement for originality. Id. Thus, the author or creator is the person who generates the 
work by contributing at least a minimal amount of creativity into its creation. See id. (holding that 
authorship is tied to originality in determining the copyrightability of a work).  
 2 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 2:1 (2020). 
 3 See id. (explaining that the courts fill in some of the critical gaps left by the Copyright Act). In 
copyright law, federal common law answers the questions the Copyright Act leaves unaddressed. See 
17 U.S.C. § 301 (preempting all state law that falls within the scope of 17 U.S.C. § 102 and § 103); 
see also Sybersound Recs., Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that fed-
eral law preempts any state law that conflicts with federal copyright law); Foad Consulting Grp., Inc. 
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Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
considered the legal possibility of implied sublicensing in copyright law.4 The 
First Circuit, in this case of first impression, held that implied sublicenses are 
legally possible where a licensee has a nonexclusive license that allows for 
unrestricted sublicensing.5 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit’s holding that implied subli-
censes are a legal possibility is correct but that the legal standard should be 
modified to guide future cases effectively.6 Part I provides an overview of the 
legal and factual background of PIC III.7 Part II discusses the First Circuit’s 
holding and the existing framework of implied licensing law that guided the 
court’s reasoning.8 Lastly, Part III argues that although the First Circuit’s con-
clusion is correct, a more explicit three-part test that incorporates the delivery, 
request, and intent factors would better serve as the guiding precedent for 
whether an implied sublicense exists between a licensee and sublicensee.9 
I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF PIC III 
In 2020, in Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a copyright licensee with 
an unrestricted right to sublicense a work may convey this right impliedly, 
without express permission.10 Section A of this Part discusses the concept of 
licensing under both the Copyright Act and common law.11 Section B evaluates 
the relevant facts and procedural history of PIC III.12 
                                                                                                                      
v. Azzalino, 270 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that federal law decides whether an implied 
copyright license exists). Other examples of judge-created copyright law include: (1) whether the 
work in question is original; (2) the copyright’s scope; (3) whether an alleged author’s contributions 
qualify for author status; and (4) the elements of an infringement claim. 1 PATRY, supra note 2, § 2:1. 
A sublicense grants a third party either all or some portion of the rights granted to the licensee under 
the master license. Sublicense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 4 Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 953 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 5 Id. A license serves as permission from the copyright owner to use the copyrighted work. 2 
PATRY, supra note 2, § 5:118; see also License, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY (desk ed. 2012) (ex-
plaining that a license gives the authorization to do something which could not be done without that 
license). By extension, a sublicense conveys some or all of the licensee’s rights onto a third-party. 
Sublicense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3. 
 6 See infra notes 10–109 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 10–54 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 55–79 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 80–109 and accompanying text. 
 10 Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (Pic III), 953 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2020). 
 11 See infra notes 13–37 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 38–54 and accompanying text. 
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A. Licensing in Copyright Law 
Despite the U.S. Constitution establishing Congress’s power to grant pro-
tections to authors and inventors to promote the advancement of arts and sci-
ence, Congress did not enact the Copyright Act until 1790.13 According to the 
1976 revision of the Copyright Act, a copyright owner may transfer ownership 
of the copyright by operation of law or through a writing signed by the owner.14 
Although the 1976 Act provides robust regulatory requirements for the transfer 
of copyright ownership, many aspects of copyright law are judge-made.15 For 
example, the Act only vaguely addresses licensing.16 Specifically, the Act does 
not discuss nonexclusive licenses.17 Instead, it explicitly limits ownership of a 
                                                                                                                      
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors and 
inventors); Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124, 124–26 (current version at 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–1401) (codifying federal copyright legislation); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 1, at 1:1 
(stating that Congress first enacted copyright legislation in 1790). In 1790, the first U.S. Congress 
implemented the copyright clause in the U.S. Constitution into the Copyright Act. Copyright Time-
line: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N OF RSCH. LIBRS., https://www.arl.org/
copyright-timeline [https://perma.cc/7D9P-WMW6]. The 1790 Act granted authors of copyrighted 
works the right to print, duplicate, or publish their work for up to fourteen years with an option to 
renew for a second fourteen-year term. Id. In 1909, Congress broadened the Act’s scope to include all 
works of authorship, and it extended the protection term to twenty-eight years with the possibility to 
renew for another term of twenty-eight years. See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. 60-349, 35 Stat. 
1075, 1084 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 302) (adding that the 1909 Act protected all writings 
and artwork, including periodicals and orally delivered addresses, such as sermons and lectures). Fi-
nally, in 1976, Congress significantly revised the Act to address the substantial impacts of technologi-
cal advancements on copyright law and to align the United States with international copyright practic-
es. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 1, at 1:1, 2:2 (observing that technological growth necessi-
tated a revision to the Act and that the 1976 Act conformed with international copyright law); Copy-
right Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, supra (stating that the 1976 Act sought to 
incorporate the impact of technological developments on copyrighted works and adhere to the Berne 
Convention). The 1976 Act further expanded the scope of the Act by preempting all previous copy-
right law and extending the term of protection to the life of the author plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 301–302; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 1, at 2:1–2:3 (explaining that federal preemp-
tion and duration of the copyright are two critical changes the 1976 Act made). 
 14 17 U.S.C. § 201(d). Ownership of a copyright initially vests in the author of the work. Id. 
§ 201(a). The copyright holder may transfer that ownership through “an assignment, mortgage, exclu-
sive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the 
exclusive rights comprised in a copyright . . . but not including a nonexclusive license.” Id. § 101. 
 15 1 PATRY, supra note 2, § 2:1. 
 16 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 204(a) (indicating only that an exclusive license, which must be in writ-
ing, can transfer copyright ownership); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 
1990) (stating that the Copyright Act necessarily excludes nonexclusive licenses from § 204’s scope 
because they are not in writing). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the Copyright Act’s silence on the 
creation, interpretation, and assignability of exclusive licenses to mean that this type of license must 
be evidenced by writing, but even a “one-line pro forma statement will do.” Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d 
at 557. 
 17 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (referencing nonexclusive licenses only to state that they cannot transfer 
ownership); see also Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558 (stating that § 204’s writing requirement for 
ownership transfers excludes nonexclusive licenses). 
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copyright to owners of an exclusive right.18 Similarly, the Act’s definition of 
ownership transfer excludes nonexclusive licenses.19 In other words, a nonexclu-
sive license, which an owner may grant to multiple licensees, does not convey an 
ownership interest to the licensee; it only permits the licensee to use that work as 
specified by the license agreement.20 Unless the licensee exceeds the scope of 
the license, the copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive license generally 
waives the right to sue the licensee for infringement.21 
                                                                                                                      
 18 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that an exclusive license, but not a nonexclusive license, can trans-
fer ownership of a copyright); see also 2 PATRY, supra note 2, § 5:127 (explaining that § 101 of the 
Copyright Act limits copyright ownership to one who holds an exclusive right). Copyright ownership 
and real personal property ownership each carry with it similar rights, including the right of the owner 
to prevent others from using their property. 18 AM. JUR. 2D, Copyright and Literary Property § 3 
(2020) (citing Sprinkler Warehouse, Inc. v. Systematic Rain, Inc., 859 N.W.2d 527, 534 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2015), aff’d, 880 N.W.2d 16 (Minn. 2016)). Moreover, the owner of a copyright has the exclu-
sive right to reproduce or authorize the reproduction of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). Courts have also 
affirmed that an exclusive license conveys an ownership interest because the agreement grants the 
licensee an exclusive right to use the work, which necessarily impairs the value of the copyright to the 
owners who can no longer use or exploit any rights to the work. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 
(2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that an exclusive license confers an ownership interest which destroys the 
copyright’s value to the owners because nobody but the exclusive licensee can use the work); Camp-
bell v. Bd. of Trs., 817 F.2d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that an exclusive license transfers the 
property interest to the licensee). 
 19 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (stating that only exclusive rights may be transferred in a transfer of 
ownership); see also Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(stating that the owner preserves ownership over the copyright even after granting a nonexclusive 
license). 
 20 Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 2016); Beastie Boys, 983 F.3d 
at 347. A license agreement gives the licensee permission to use the copyright work and provides a 
defense against an infringement claim as long as that use is within the scope of the agreement. See 
Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. RMG Techs. Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1106–07 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (defining a 
license as giving the licensee permission or authority and explaining that use of the license beyond the 
scope of the agreement may give rise to copyright infringement liability). Further reinforcing the non-
exclusive licensee’s lack of copyright ownership, § 501 limits standing to sue on an infringement 
action to owners of an exclusive right and beneficial owners of those rights, meaning a nonexclusive 
licensee may not bring an infringement action. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (stating that only an owner 
(legal or beneficial) with an exclusive right can institute an infringement action); see also Saregama 
India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a nonexclusive licensee did 
not have the statutory standing to sue on a copyright infringement claim); Latin Am. Music Co. v. 
Archdiocese of San Juan, 499 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the lower court correctly ruled 
that a nonexclusive licensee’s lack of standing precluded it from bringing a copyright infringement 
claim). 
 21 See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that 
by granting a nonexclusive license, a copyright owner waives the right to sue the licensee for in-
fringement), amended by No. 09-15932, 2011 WL 538748 (9th Cir. 2011); Harris v. Emus Recs. 
Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that a copyright license is an agreement not to 
sue for infringement). See generally Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991) (establishing the elements of a copyright infringement claim as (1) ownership of a copyright 
and (2) illegal copying of that original work). Even if the nonexclusive license bars the copyright owner 
from bringing an infringement claim, the owner may still sue for breach of contract. See MDY Indus., 
629 F.3d at 939 (stating that if the owner grants a nonexclusive license, the licensor generally waives 
the right to sue for copyright infringement but may still sue for breach of contract); accord Ticketmas-
2021] The Legal Possibility of Impliedly Sublicensing a Copyrighted Work II.-429 
Similar to the issue of nonexclusive licenses, the Copyright Act is silent 
on implied licensing, leaving courts to chart the parameters of those licenses.22 
Courts, in turn, have concluded that where the license is nonexclusive and 
there is no transfer of ownership, the transfer of copyright need not be in writ-
ing.23 Rather, a licensor may grant a nonexclusive license orally or by implica-
tion if the circumstances demonstrate that the parties intended to enter into a 
license.24 This implied license is limited in scope, and it only permits the use 
of the copyrighted work in an acceptable manner under the license agree-
ment.25 Accordingly, any use of a copyrighted work within the terms of an im-
plied license does not infringe the copyright.26 
                                                                                                                      
ter L.L.C. v. Prestige Ent., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (reasoning that by grant-
ing a nonexclusive license, a copyright owner waives any infringement claims and may sue solely for 
breach of contract). 
 22 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (discussing licensing in the context of exclusive licenses which are 
necessarily express, not implied); see also 2 PATRY, supra note 2, § 5:131 (noting that implied licens-
es are “creatures of [the] courts”). 
 23 See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(concluding that the requirement to convey transfers of copyright in writing does not apply to nonex-
clusive licenses where ownership of the copyright is not transferred); see also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03[A][7] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2020) (ex-
plaining that an owner may grant a nonexclusive copyright license orally or impliedly through their con-
duct). The doctrine of implied licensing emerged from implied-in-fact contracts, which do not require an 
agreement to be in writing. See Interscope Recs. v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CV 10-1662, 2010 WL 
11505708, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) (stating that the issue of implied licensing is a contract law 
question); Implied-in-Fact Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (defining an implied-
in-fact contract as a contract that is inferred through the parties’ conduct); Orit F. Afori, Implied Li-
cense: An Emerging New Standard in Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
275, 276–77 (2009) (discussing how the implied license doctrine was imported from contract law to 
copyright law). But see Christopher M. Newman, “What Exactly Are You Implying?”: The Elusive 
Nature of the Implied Copyright License, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 504, 517 (2014) (argu-
ing that property law, not contract law, should drive implied licensing law). Implied-in-fact contracts 
are borne from the parties’ exhibition of “mutual agreement and intent to promise, when the agree-
ment and promise have . . . not been expressed in words.” 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2020). Mutual assent, or a meeting of the minds, is the most fundamental 
precursor to forming a contract. Smith v. Jenkins, 732 F.3d 51, 75 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Nash v. Trs. 
of Bos. Univ., 946 F.2d 960, 966 (1st Cir. 1991)).  
 24 See Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 40–41 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that a licensor 
can grant a nonexclusive license by implication); Korman v. HBC Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1291, 1293 
(11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that a nonexclusive license may form from an oral transaction); Effects 
Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that a nonexclusive license can 
be implied through conduct or granted orally). See generally License, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 5 (stating that an implied license may manifest through the parties’ conduct, even without 
any words of assent). 
 25 Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41; see also Danielson, 322 F.3d at 40 (stating that staying within 
the bounds of a nonexclusive license immunizes licensees from copyright infringement suits). 
 26 See Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41 (reasoning that use of a copyrighted work within the scope 
of the nonexclusive, implied license does not infringe the copyright). Once a proponent raises an im-
plied license as a defense to an infringement claim, that proponent has the burden of proving its exist-
ence. Id. 
II.-430 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
Although circuit courts have acknowledged the legal possibility of im-
plied licenses, they are divided on whether elements beyond intent, including 
request and delivery, are required to establish an implied license.27 Some cir-
cuits, like the Second and Seventh Circuits, have construed implied licenses in 
limited circumstances by relying on a three-factor test.28 This tripartite formu-
la, derived from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 deci-
sion in Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, requires that (1) the licensee request 
the creation of the work; (2) the licensor create and deliver that work to the 
requestor; and (3) the licensor intend that the licensee distribute the work. 29 
Conversely, other circuits, like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, have held that im-
plied licenses can exist even when the three elements are not satisfied.30 Going 
further than the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the First Circuit ruled that the touch-
stone for finding an implied license is intent, suggesting that neither request 
nor delivery are necessary.31 
                                                                                                                      
 27 Compare Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that 
request, delivery, and intent must be established to infer an implied license), and SmithKline Beecham 
Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that courts 
have construed implied licenses where request, delivery, and intent were established), with Falcon 
Enters., Inc. v. Publishers Serv., Inc., 438 F. App’x 579, 581 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (concluding that 
an implied license existed where all three factors were not fully satisfied), and Baisden v. I’m Ready 
Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 501 (5th Cir. 2012) (observing that the Fifth Circuit has never concluded 
that an implied license cannot exist where all three factors were not met), and Estate of Hevia, 602 
F.3d at 41 (stating that intent is the critical factor in establishing an implied license). 
 28 See Muhammad-Ali, 832 F.3d at 762 (relying strictly on the delivery, request, and intent fac-
tors); SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 25 (observing that courts have inferred an implied license where the three 
elements, delivery, request, and intent, were met); see also Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991–92 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that request, delivery, and intent must be established). 
 29 See Justin Hughes, Actors as Authors in American Copyright Law, 51 CONN. L. REV. 1, 56 
(2019) (stating that Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen established the three-factor test and listing out its 
requirements (citing Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558–59)). In 2011, in Falcon Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Publishers Service, Inc., the Ninth Circuit departed from its tripartite formula and indicated that an 
implied license could exist even where request was not established. 438 F. App’x at 581. The Second 
and Seventh Circuits still adhere to the three-factor test. See SmithKline, 211 F.3d at 25 (stating and 
applying the Effects Associates standard); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(reiterating the Effects Associates test). 
 30 See Baisden, 693 F.3d at 501 (clarifying that an implied license can arise when the totality of the 
parties’ conduct supports that outcome and the tripartite formula need not be met); Falcon Enters., 438 
F. App’x at 581 (stating that an implied license existed where the licensor delivered the work and intend-
ed for the licensee to copy and distribute it). Some scholars have similarly suggested that an implied 
license can exist even when one or more of the elements are not met. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra 
note 23, § 10.03[A][7] (stating that it is questionable for courts to strictly use three factors as the only test 
for an implied license); 2 PATRY, supra note 2, § 5:131 (noting that the three factors are not exhaustive of 
the elements for finding an implied license). 
 31 See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(glossing over request and delivery and focusing on the intent of the copyright owner); see also Estate 
of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41 (clarifying that intent is the touchstone for establishing an implied license). 
Adding a different interpretation to the intent analysis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in 2002, in Nelson-Salabes, Inc. v. Morningstar Development, chose to focus its inquiry on “the 
totality of the circumstances.” 284 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir. 2002). The Nelson-Salabes court further 
2021] The Legal Possibility of Impliedly Sublicensing a Copyrighted Work II.-431 
In the context of copyright sublicensing, the Copyright Act dictates neither 
the terms nor the medium to convey a sublicense.32 A sublicense grants a third 
party, the sublicensee, all or some portion of the rights granted to the licensee 
under the original license.33 Unlike for implied licenses, common law is relative-
ly underdeveloped in the context of copyright sublicensing.34 The few circuit 
courts to have weighed in on this subject have assessed sublicenses precipitating 
from exclusive licenses.35 These circuits have indicated that, for acts within the 
scope of the sublicense, a copyright owner may not assert an infringement claim 
against a sublicensee if the owner granted the licensee permission to subli-
cense.36 Within the realm of implied sublicensing, however, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Oregon stands as the lone court to have addressed this 
                                                                                                                      
specified that the question of intent focuses on whether: (1) the parties engaged in a temporary, discrete 
transaction that was not a part of an ongoing relationship; (2) the creator used a written contract specify-
ing that the copyrighted work could only be used with the creator’s express permission or involvement; 
and (3) the creator’s conduct indicated that the copyrighted material could be permissibly used without 
the creator’s involvement or consent. Id. at 516. The Fifth Circuit has also inferred intent through per-
mission from the licensor or the absence of an objection. See Baisden, 693 F.3d at 500 (reasoning that 
either the licensor’s permission or lack of objection can evince consent for an implied license); see 
also Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 784 F. App’x 253, 256 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(per curiam) (inferring intent from the creator’s lack of objection). 
 32 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (stating copyright protections that noticeably do not address subli-
censes). 
 33 Sublicense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2; see also Spinelli v. NFL, 903 F.3d 185, 
203 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating that a sublicensee cannot obtain the rights to a copyrighted work if the 
licensee did not have the right to sublicense); Sinclair v. Ziff Davis, L.L.C., 454 F. Supp. 3d 342, 344 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (barring a copyright holder who permitted a licensee to grant a sublicense from pre-
vailing on an infringement claim against the sublicensee). 
 34 See Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 953 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) 
(noting that only one other court has opined on implied sublicensing); Catalogue Creatives, Inc. v. 
Pac. Spirit Corp., No. CV 03-966, 2005 WL 1950231, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding, in a case of 
first impression, that an implied license cannot give rise to an implied sublicense). 
 35 See Spinelli, 903 F.3d at 197 (assessing whether a sublicense can arise from an exclusive li-
cense); Gardner v. Nike, 279 F.3d 774, 780 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing whether an exclusive licensee 
may sublicense without the copyright owner’s permission). In 2002, in Gardner v. Nike, the Ninth 
Circuit held that a copyright licensee does not have the right to sublicense under an exclusive license 
without the licensor’s consent. 279 F.3d at 781. Some courts, scholars, and authors have criticized the 
Gardner decision for misinterpreting the Copyright Act and improperly analogizing to patent law. See, 
e.g., Traicoff v. Digit. Media, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 2d 872, 877 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (concluding that the Gard-
ner decision was unpersuasive because the Copyright Act actually allows exclusive licensees to confer a 
downstream sublicense); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, § 10.02[B][4][b] (stating that copyright 
law’s constitutional roots debunk Gardner’s reasoning); Peter H. Kang & Jia Ann Yan, Doctrine of Indi-
visibility Revived?, 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. HIGH TECH L.J. 365, 371–73 (2002) (critiquing Gardner 
for being inconsistent with congressional intent); Kate Williams, Note, Gardner v. Nike, 18 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 371, 372 (2003) (arguing that the Gardner court ignored precedent, misread the Copyright 
Act, and inappropriately analogized to patent law). 
 36 See Sinclair, 454 F. Supp. at 344 (establishing that a license permitting sublicensing bars the 
owner from suing the sublicensee for infringement); cf. Spinelli, 903 F.3d at 203 (indicating that a 
sublicense cannot exist when the exclusive licensee does not have the right to sublicense); Gardner, 
279 F.3d at 780 (holding that an exclusive licensee cannot sublicense without permission from the 
copyright owner). 
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question, and, in 2004, the court ruled in Catalogue Creatives, Inc. v. Pacific 
Spirit Corp. that an implied license cannot give rise to an implied sublicense.37 
B. Factual and Procedural History of PIC III 
In PIC III, a case of first impression, the First Circuit assessed a licen-
see’s right to impliedly sublicense a photograph of an industrial product to its 
distributor.38 The plaintiff, Photographic Illustrators Corporation (PIC), 
through its photographer, Paul Picone, offers commercial photography ser-
vices, including photographs of consumer products, to its clients.39 PIC’s cli-
ent, Osram Sylvania, Inc. (Sylvania), is a lightbulb manufacturer that uses 
many of PIC’s copyrighted photographs of lightbulbs to market and sell its 
products through its dealers and distributors.40 After a dispute arose regarding 
the scope of Sylvania’s rights to use the photos, PIC and Sylvania entered into 
a three million dollar nonexclusive license agreement with a provision permit-
ting Sylvania to sublicense PIC’s photographs.41 Defendant Orgill, Inc. (Orgill) 
                                                                                                                      
 37 See Catalogue Creatives, 2005 WL 1950231, at *2 (ruling that an implied license cannot spawn 
an implied sublicense). 
 38 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. Prior to Photographic Illustrators Corporation’s (PIC) lawsuit against 
Orgill, only the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon had considered the issue of whether an 
implied license can exist, but that court analyzed whether an implied sublicense can be derived from an 
implied, nonexclusive license, rather than from an express, nonexclusive license. See Catalogue Crea-
tives, 2005 WL 1950231, at *2 (stating that the defendant failed to offer case law supporting the conten-
tion that a party holding an implied license can impliedly sublicense to a third party). 
 39 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. 
 40 Id. In North America, Sylvania sells LED lamps, traditional light sources, standardized luminar-
ies, and connected lighting solutions. General Lighting Products, SYLVANIA, https://www.sylvania.
com/products/Pages/General-Lighting-Products.aspx [https://perma.cc/95SZ-XA5V]. The U.S. Su-
preme Court first considered photographs within the scope of copyright law in 1884. See Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54, 55 (1884) (assessing whether photographs are 
copyrightable). In 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the Court rejected distinguish-
ing photographs from maps, charts, or prints, all of which the Copyright Act of 1790 and its subse-
quent revisions protected. Id. at 57, 60. The Court held that photographs could be considered writings 
if they represented “original intellectual conceptions of the author.” Id. at 58. Under the Copyright 
Act, copyright protection covers “original works of authorship” of pictorial works. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 102(a). 
 41 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. The sixteen-page licensing agreement granted Sylvania a “non-
exclusive, worldwide license . . . to freely Use, sub-license Use, and permit Use, in its sole and abso-
lute discretion, in perpetuity, anywhere in the world.” Id. The PIC-Sylvania agreement gave “the 
greatest possible interpretation” to the term “Use” and defined it to include “copy[ing], edit[ing] . . . 
reproduce[ing], transmit[ting], display[ing], broadcast[ing], print[ing], publish[ing], use in connection 
with any media (including . . . advertising, packaging, promotional and collateral materials).” Brief of 
Appellee Orgill, Inc. at 5, id. (No. 19-1452). Sylvania also agreed to an attribution restriction requiring 
it, when reasonably possible, “to include a copyright notice indicating PIC as the copyright owner and/or 
. . . [crediting] Paul Picone as the photographer.” PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. The United States has very 
few protections for copyright attribution. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution: Copyright and the Right 
to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 21, 69 (2007). The Visual Artist Rights Act of 1990, for example, limits its 
protection to visual artists’ right to assert ownership of their work. Id. (citing scattered sections of 17 
U.S.C.). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a visual artwork as a single copy of a photograph, 
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is a hardware distributor that markets and sells Sylvania’s lightbulbs through a 
network of dealers.42 After Orgill requested PIC’s lightbulb photographs to use 
in its electronic and paper catalogs, Sylvania sent some photos to the distribu-
tor and then directed Orgill to its website, from which Orgill copied and pasted 
photos for its use.43 Sylvania did not enter into a written agreement with Orgill 
and did not inform Orgill of the attribution restriction in Sylvania’s license 
with PIC.44 Orgill also did not seek PIC’s permission to use the copyrighted 
photographs.45 
In response, PIC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Massachusetts, bringing claims against Orgill and one of Orgill’s dealers, 
Farm & City Supply, L.L.C., for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 501.46 After PIC filed this lawsuit, Sylvania and Orgill entered into an ex-
                                                                                                                      
print, drawing, painting, or sculpture). The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) also incorpo-
rates attribution related provisions by prohibiting any “alteration or removal of ‘copyright manage-
ment information’ (CMI) expressed in association with a work.” Lastowka, supra at 69–70 (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 1202). CMI refers to certain identifying information in relation to the work, including the 
title of the work, the name of the author(s) and/or copyright owners of the work, and the terms and 
conditions allowing for the use of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(c). The DMCA’s provisions outlaw 
“the knowing distribution of false CMI that enables copyright infringement, as well as intentional 
removal or alteration of CMI with knowledge that this will facilitate copyright infringement.” 
Lastowka, supra at 70–71 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a)–(b)). 
 42 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. Orgill’s customer base includes “more than [six-thousand] retail hard-
ware stores, home centers, pro lumber dealers, and farm stores” in over fifty countries, including the 
United States. About Us, ORGILL, https://www.orgill.com/index.aspx?tab=667 [https://perma.cc/
5DDE-ZQJY]. The distributor’s inventory includes approximately one thousand Sylvania products. 
PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. 
 43 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC II), 370 F. Supp. 3d 232, 239 (D. Mass. 
2019), aff’d, 953 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting that Orgill did not have contact with PIC prior to this 
lawsuit). 
 46 Photographic Illustrators Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC I), 118 F. Supp. 3d 398, 400 (D. Mass. 
2015), summary judgment denied by and granted by 370 F. Supp. 3d 232 (D. Mass. 2019), aff’d, 953 
F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2020). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (identifying a copyright infringer as “anyone 
who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner”); supra note 21 (outlining the ele-
ments of a copyright infringement claim). Under its copyright infringement claim, PIC asserted that 
Orgill used its photos without a license and without attributing the photos to PIC or its photographer 
in violation of the attribution requirement in the PIC-Sylvania license. Plaintiff’s Opposition to De-
fendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, PIC I, 118 F. Supp. 3d 398 (No. 1:14-CV-11818). PIC 
also sued Orgill for violations of the DMCA and false designation of origin and advertising under the 
Lanham Act. PIC II, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 240. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 1202 (prohibiting anyone from 
providing false CMI with the knowledge or intent to enable or conceal infringement); Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (describing the liability of a party who falsely designates the origin of a good or 
service). In addition, PIC filed more than thirty separate lawsuits against other Sylvania dealers and 
distributors alleging a violation of the PIC-Sylvania license. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58–59. Seven of the 
other cases, also filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, were consolidated and 
referred to arbitration. PIC II, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41. Sylvania intervened as an interested party in 
these cases. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59. The district court, however, denied Sylvania’s motion to intervene in 
the instant case. Id. 
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press sublicense agreement, effective nunc pro tunc, or retroactively.47 There-
after, Orgill moved for summary judgment on all claims.48 The district court 
held that Orgill had a sublicense from Sylvania to use the photos, but it did not 
determine the scope of the sublicense.49 Orgill subsequently renewed its motion 
for summary judgment on the sublicense defense and on a new claim of defen-
sive, nonmutual issue preclusion.50 Ultimately, the court granted summary 
                                                                                                                      
 47 PIC I, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 401. Orgill and Sylvania’s “Confirmatory Copyright Sublicense 
Agreement” stated that the parties “wish[ed] to confirm the terms upon which [Sylvania] ha[d] permit-
ted and sublicensed Orgill to Use the [PIC] images.” Appellant’s Opening Brief at 5, PIC I, 953 F.3d 
56 (No. 19-1452) (alteration in original). The retroactive sublicense specified that the agreement con-
firmed and regranted a sublicense dating back to June 2006, the effective date of the PIC-Sylvania 
license. Id. 
 48 PIC I, 118 F. Supp. 3d at 400. Summary judgment is appropriate when the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law and no genuine dispute exists relating to any material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 
56(a). A factual dispute is material if it could affect the outcome of the lawsuit, and a dispute about a 
material fact is genuine if a reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party after consider-
ing the evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 49 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59. The district court also granted Orgill’s motion for summary judgment on 
the DMCA and Lanham Act claims. Id. Furthermore, the court decided that Farm & City Supply, L.L.C. 
was “an innocent infringer,” prompting PIC to drop it from the case. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59. Finally, the 
court granted the parties’ motion to stay proceedings pending the decision of a separate arbitration. Id. A 
court may choose to stay a case while waiting for the outcome of another proceeding, such as a related 
arbitration, due to the “difficulties of anticipating the claim or issue-preclusion effects” of the pending 
proceeding. Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Manganella v. Evans-
ton Ins. Co., 700 F.3d 585, 591 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that for claim and issue preclusion, arbitral 
decisions are treated similar to judicial decisions). In the separate arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator 
determined that the attribution restriction was a covenant and not a condition and that by allowing its 
distributors to duplicate these photos without attribution, Sylvania breached this covenant. PIC III, 953 
F.3d at 59. A covenant is a promise by one party to do something for the other party, whereas a condi-
tion is an event or occurrence that will trigger one or more obligations under a contract. Condition, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2; Covenant, id. The distinction between a condition and 
covenant matters because “a licensee who violates a condition of a license (and thus exceeds its scope) 
cannot claim the license as a defense to copyright infringement,” but if the licensee violates a cove-
nant, then the licensor can only sue for breach of contract. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59; accord MDY In-
dus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Graham v. James, 144 
F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that a breach of covenant by the licensee provides a cause of 
action for the licensor’s breach of contract claim). In addition, the arbitrator, relying on PIC’s conces-
sion, decided that Sylvania had a sublicense with its other distributors. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59. 
 50 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59; see also Brief of Appellee Orgill, Inc., supra note 41, at 28–29 (assert-
ing that the arbitrator’s decision precluded PIC from arguing that implied sublicenses are a legal im-
possibility). A defendant may invoke defensive, nonmutual issue preclusion to preclude a plaintiff 
from relitigating an identical issue it unsuccessfully litigated against another party. See Parklane Hosi-
ery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328–29 (1979) (stating that the Court has held that a plaintiff is es-
topped from relitigating an unsuccessful claim it brought against another party). The mutuality of 
parties is not required, and, instead, the question rests on whether a party received the opportunity to 
reach a full resolution on that same issue. Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756, 771 (1st 
Cir. 2010). Courts treat arbitral decisions similarly to judicial judgments in the context of issue preclu-
sion. Manganella, 700 F.3d at 591; see also FleetBoston Fin. Corp. v. Alt, 638 F.3d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 
2011) (stating that an arbitral award has a preclusive effect on all claims the arbitrator hears). 
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judgment to Orgill and reaffirmed its previous ruling that Sylvania granted Orgill 
an implied sublicense with an attribution restriction that was a covenant.51 
Thereafter, PIC appealed to the First Circuit on the grounds that a subli-
cense to use a copyrighted work must be express, whereas Sylvania’s subli-
cense to Orgill was at best implied.52 PIC additionally asserted that there were 
genuine issues of fact as to whether a jury could find that Orgill obtained per-
mission, either express or implied, to use PIC’s photographs.53 The First Cir-
cuit held that where a licensee has an unrestricted right to sublicense, a subli-
cense between the licensee and sublicensee may be implied by the actions be-
tween the two parties.54 
II. DISCUSSION OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S RULING IN PIC III 
Agreeing to hear PIC’s appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit, in 2020, in Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 
considered whether an implied sublicense is a legal possibility.55 Although ex-
ploring new territory in copyright law, implied sublicensing, the First Circuit 
                                                                                                                      
 51 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 59–60. Because the parties to the arbitration did not raise or contest the as-
sumption that, under the PIC-Sylvania license, Sylvania could impliedly grant a sublicense, the district 
court allowed PIC to argue that, as a matter of law, copyright sublicenses are effective only when granted 
expressly. Id. at 59; cf. supra note 50 (explaining how issue preclusion applies after an arbitrator’s 
decision). Unlike the issue of an implied sublicense, the district court concluded that the arbitral award 
precluded PIC from relitigating the construction of the PIC-Sylvania license. PIC II, 370 F. Supp. 3d at 
247. In coming to this conclusion, the court emphasized that it had no difficulty applying the factors 
for issue preclusion to the arbitrator’s decision because the arbitrator wrote a thorough decision detail-
ing and analyzing all of the parties’ claims and counterclaims. Id. at 243. In fact, the arbitrator even 
highlighted that, despite PIC’s contentions, there was no requirement to convey sublicenses through 
writing in the PIC-Sylvania license. Id. at 244. Furthermore, the attribution restriction issue related to 
Sylvania and Orgill’s Confirmatory Sublicense, which Orgill argued included an attribution require-
ment that was a condition, not a covenant. Id. at 248; see supra note 49 (explaining the difference 
between a covenant and a condition). The court concluded that the language of the agreement indicat-
ed that Orgill and Sylvania viewed the requirement as a covenant, which, if violated, would trigger a 
breach of contract, rather than as a condition that affected the validity of the sublicense. PIC II, 370 
F. Supp. 3d at 248–49. Finally, in granting summary judgment to Orgill, the district court focused its 
analysis on the intent requirement and highlighted that implied licenses are a type of implied-in-fact 
contract. Id. at 246–47. See generally supra note 23 (defining implied-in-fact contract). 
 52 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 60. 
 53 Id. Although the district court relied on a supposed concession by PIC in its ruling that Sylva-
nia did grant a sublicense, PIC argued on appeal that it did not, in fact, concede this point. PIC III, 953 
F.3d at 64; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 16, PIC III, 953 F.3d 56 (No. 19-1452). The First Circuit noted 
the ambiguity in whether PIC actually waived this argument based on the hearing transcripts and, 
accordingly, chose to “assume without deciding” that no waiver existed. PIC III, 953 F.3d at 64. Gen-
erally, a counsel’s in-court admission may be binding, but the statement “must be clear and unambig-
uous.” Butynski v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 592 F.3d 272, 277 (1st Cir. 2010); accord Lima v. 
Holder, 758 F.3d 72, 79 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 54 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 64; see also infra notes 55–79 and accompanying text (discussing the First 
Circuit’s ruling in PIC III). 
 55 Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 953 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2020) (noting 
that no circuit court has assessed whether a sublicense agreement must be express). 
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drew its reasoning from familiar legal standards relating to implied licensing 
between a copyright owner and a licensee.56 Section A of this Part discusses 
the First Circuit’s rationale for why implied sublicenses can exist.57 Section B 
describes the First Circuit’s application of the implied licensing framework to 
sublicensing agreements.58 
A. The Legal Possibility of an Implied Sublicense 
Considering the objectives of the Copyright Act of 1976, the First Circuit 
concluded that implied sublicensing is permissible.59 The court specified that 
implied sublicensing does not undermine the policy reasons behind the Copy-
right Act, as the original licensor is still permitted to control the confines of 
any downstream sublicense when executing a license agreement with the licen-
see.60 As the court explained, although the Copyright Act seeks to encourage the 
production of original expression for the public, the right of the creator to control 
this work must be balanced with supporting the public’s access to it.61 
The First Circuit also acknowledged that, in 2005, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Oregon also considered the issue of implied sublicensing in 
Catalogue Creatives, Inc. v. Pacific Spirit Corp.62 The First Circuit distin-
guished that case, however, as it involved the grant of an implied sublicense 
from an implied license.63 In contrast, PIC negotiated a written license with 
                                                                                                                      
 56 Id. at 61–62. See generally supra note 27 and accompanying text (outlining the different circuits’ 
requirements for establishing implied licenses). 
 57 See infra notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text. 
 59 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 60, 62–64 (concluding that nothing in the Copyright Act requires an 
express agreement in sublicensing). See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (codifying protections for 
copyrighted works); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 2, at 1:1 (explaining that the Copyright Act 
seeks to balance rewarding the creator with allowing the public access to the work). 
 60 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 62–63. In PIC’s case, PIC had a written, nonexclusive license with Sylva-
nia, and, as the First Circuit emphasized, PIC had ample opportunity to control the requirements of 
Sylvania’s future sublicenses. Id. at 63. Due to this opportunity for control, the First Circuit concluded 
that there was no unpredictability factor that could undermine the Copyright Act’s objective to enforce 
the certainty behind copyright ownership. Id. 
 61 Id. at 63. In 1994, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court established that the 
Copyright Act’s primary purpose is to support the public’s “access to creative works.” 510 U.S. 517, 
527 (1994); accord Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016) (quoting 
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527); see also U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl.8 (stating that the Constitution seeks 
“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”). To achieve this purpose, the Copyright Act 
must balance the interests of the creators while still allowing the public to access the works. 
Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1986 (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527). 
 62 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 62–63 (citing Catalogue Creatives, Inc. v. Pac. Spirit Corp, No. CV 03-966, 
2005 WL 1950231, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2005)). 
 63 Id. In Catalogue Creatives, Inc. v. Pacific Spirit Corp., decided by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon in 2005, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s use of certain photographs infringed 
its copyrights in those works. 2005 WL 1950231, at *1. The defendant countered that it had received an 
implied sublicense derived from an implied license. Id. at *1–2. Ultimately, the U.S. District Court for 
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Sylvania that expressly permitted sublicensing.64 Accordingly, the First Circuit 
in PIC III concluded that a sublicense need not be express where the licensee 
has an unrestricted right to sublicense.65 
B. The First Circuit’s Focus on Intent in Implied Sublicensing 
In developing the legal standard for implied sublicensing, the First Circuit 
recognized that circuit courts have developed different tests for determining 
whether an implied license exists.66 The court emphasized, however, that, for 
implied licenses, it has historically glossed over the first two elements, request 
and delivery, and instead focused its inquiry on intent.67 Specifically, in its focus 
on intent, the First Circuit noted that it has evaluated whether (1) the parties en-
gaged in a short-term deal or a continuing relationship; (2) the original licensor 
used a written contract stipulating that the work could only be used with their 
express permission; and (3) the creator’s acts during creation or delivery sug-
gested that use of the material without consent was permissible.68 Correspond-
ingly, in PIC III, the First Circuit concluded that intent is the critical require-
ment, and it rejected applying the request and delivery prongs of the three-factor 
test to Sylvania and Orgill’s alleged sublicense agreement.69 The court reasoned 
that strict adherence to the three-prong test would ensure that sublicenses were 
seldom implied because an alleged sublicensee predominantly interacts with the 
licensee and rarely with the copyright owner to request the work.70 
                                                                                                                      
the District of Oregon held that an implied licensee does not have the authority to grant an implied subli-
cense, thereby concluding that implied sublicenses are legally impossible when granted under an implied 
license. Id. at *2. 
 64 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58, 63; see also Brief of Appellee Orgill, supra note 41, at 5 (quoting the 
terms in PIC’s license with Sylvania which explicitly permitted licensing). PIC also agreed that it had 
an express license with Sylvania and that the license allowed Sylvania to sublicense its rights to a 
third party. Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 47, at 3. 
 65 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58. 
 66 Id. at 61–62; see supra note 27 and accompanying text (comparing the different circuit courts’ 
approaches to establishing an implied license). 
 67 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 61–62 (citing Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 
2010)). In 2010, in Estate of Hevia v. Portrio Corp., a case analyzing a possible implied license of an 
architectural design, the First Circuit chose to sidestep the request and delivery factors to focus on the 
creator’s intent. 602 F.3d at 41 (citing John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 
F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2003)). 
 68 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 61. The First Circuit further noted that Estate of Hevia repeated the same 
framework that it followed in 2003 in John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Properties, in-
cluding bypassing the delivery and request elements. Id. (citing Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 41). 
 69 Id. (“The touchstone for finding an implied license . . . is intent.” (quoting Danielson, 322 F.3d 
at 40)). 
 70 Id. at 62. The First Circuit analogized this situation to the assignment of mortgages because an 
assignment of a mortgage to a third party does not need to meet the same requirements as those that 
apply to the granting of a mortgage. Id. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGS. 
§§ 1.5, 5.4 (AM. L. INST. 1997) (describing the creation and transfer of mortgages). 
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After establishing intent as the key factor in this issue, the court explained 
that Sylvania and Orgill’s conduct could evince an implied sublicense.71 First, 
the court reasoned that Sylvania, as a manufacturer, would undoubtedly want 
its distributor to use the photos to sell its products.72 The court explained that it 
did not make sense for Sylvania to expect Orgill to successfully sell lightbulbs 
without using photos of the product.73 Second, Sylvania purchased a three mil-
lion dollar license from PIC for the right to sublicense those photos to its deal-
ers to use in selling its lightbulbs.74 Third, an employee of Orgill requested 
copies of the photos to use, and Sylvania either delivered them or directed the 
employee to a location where he could retrieve them, constituting delivery.75 
Fourth, Sylvania was aware that Orgill was using the photos, as Orgill sent the 
manufacturer a copy of its catalog twice a year, and Sylvania never challenged 
this use of the photos.76 Fifth, Orgill and Sylvania signed a sublicense agree-
ment after the start of the litigation, clearly signifying Sylvania’s prior intent to 
grant a sublicense.77 Finally, during an arbitration proceeding, PIC succeeded 
in holding Sylvania liable for breach of covenant because the manufacturer gave 
its dealers and distributors permission to use PIC’s photos without attributing 
them to PIC or its photographer.78 Per the First Circuit, it followed logically that 
Orgill was one of the distributors that received permission to use the photos.79 
                                                                                                                      
 71 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 65–66. Specifically, the First Circuit ruled that there was no dispute as to a 
material fact on whether Sylvania granted an implied sublicense to Orgill. Id. at 67. Consequently, the 
court granted summary judgment to Orgill on this issue. Id.; see also supra note 49 (explaining the 
summary judgment standard). 
 72 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 65. 
 73 Id. Generally, images shape a customer’s decision to purchase a product, and many companies 
use photographs as a key marketing technique. See Alexander Nicolaides, How Product Photos & 
Videos Influence Consumer Purchasing, LOGICBLOCK (July 30, 2018), https://www.logicblock.com/
how-photos-videos-influence-consumer-purchases [https://perma.cc/SAK8-8D9R] (explaining how 
photos influence consumers in their purchasing choices). 
 74 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 65. In other words, Sylvania purchased a license to sublicense. See id. 
 75 Id. at 65–66. The First Circuit clarified that delivery alone does not indicate a right to use a 
copyrighted work, but it can be a factor that helps establish an implied license. Id. at 65. In particular, 
it was Sylvania’s delivery of the photos in conjunction with the context of the delivery that indicated 
to the court that Sylvania intended to permit Orgill to use the photos. Id. at 65–66. 
 76 Id. at 66. 
 77 Id. The Copyright Act itself does not indicate whether a retroactive sublicense is valid, but 
courts have concluded that retroactive licenses can undermine the Copyright Act. See, e.g., Davis v. 
Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that retroactive licenses compromise the Copy-
right Act’s policies). In PIC III, however, the First Circuit emphasized that the issue was not whether 
the agreement was a valid sublicense but rather whether Sylvania had the prior intent to permit a sub-
license. 953 F.3d at 66. 
 78 PIC III, 953 F.3d at 66. 
 79 Id. 
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III. A MODIFIED THREE-FACTOR TEST WOULD SOLIDIFY  
THE FIRST CIRCUIT’S CORRECT RULING 
Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit correctly con-
cluded that implied sublicenses can exist depending on the relationship be-
tween the licensee and sublicensee, the standard for an implied sublicense 
should mirror the three-element test derived from the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit’s 1990 decision in Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen rather 
than the sole requirement of intent.80 Section A of this Part discusses why the 
First Circuit correctly ruled that implied sublicenses can exist within the 
framework of the Copyright Act and copyright common law.81 Section B ex-
plains that the First Circuit correctly substituted the licensee for the copyright 
holder in testing for an implied sublicense.82 Section C argues, contrary to the 
First Circuit’s holding, that intent alone is insufficient to establish an implied 
sublicense and the request and delivery factors are necessary to the analysis as 
well.83 
A. Implied Sublicenses Are a Legal Possibility 
Despite the lack of direct guidance on this issue, the First Circuit correct-
ly concluded that implied sublicensing is legally possible.84 Above all, any is-
sue invoking copyright law must fit within the policies of the Copyright Act, 
even if the Act is silent on the specific issue.85 Where a licensee has a license 
expressly permitting sublicensing, implied sublicensing meets the dual objec-
tives of the Act: it maintains the copyright owner’s right to control the work and 
                                                                                                                      
 80 See Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 953 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 2020) 
(holding that intent alone establishes an implied sublicense); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 
555, 558–59 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that request, delivery, and intent can establish an implied 
license). Whereas the Ninth Circuit has determined that an implied license exists where not all factors 
were met, the Second and Seventh Circuits still adhere to the strict three-element test. Cf. Muhammad-
Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 2016) (relying strictly on the delivery, request, and 
intent factors), with SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 
F.3d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that implied licenses can arise when the three elements are 
met); see also Atkins v. Fischer, 331 F.3d 988, 991–92 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that request, 
delivery, and intent must be established). 
 81 See infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 82 See infra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 83 See infra notes 94–109 and accompanying text. 
 84 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58 (holding that implied sublicenses are legally possible); infra notes 
85–88 and accompanying text (arguing that implied sublicensing frustrates neither the Copyright Act’s 
intent nor the copyright owner’s value of the work). 
 85 See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994) (establishing that the Copyright Act’s 
primary purpose is to support the dissemination of creative work to the public); U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF., supra note 2, at 1:1 (stating that the Copyright Act aims to reward the creator while still allow-
ing for the public to access the work). 
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allows for the dissemination of the work.86 Indeed, while negotiating the license, 
the licensor can determine the parameters of any downstream sublicense and still 
maintain the value of the work.87 Furthermore, circuit courts have already ac-
cepted implied licensing in copyright law, and it is reasonable for courts to ac-
cept implied sublicensing because sublicenses are byproducts of licenses.88 
B. Courts Should Substitute the Licensee in Place of the Copyright  
Owner in a Test for an Implied Sublicense 
Although sublicenses are definitionally a derivative of licenses, the First 
Circuit was correct to reason that requiring a relationship between the copy-
right owner and the sublicensee to find an implied sublicense would render 
implied sublicensing virtually impossible.89 Sublicensees generally do not in-
teract with the copyright holder because the agreement to use the copyrighted 
work is between the sublicensee and the licensee.90 Moreover, the licensee 
does not have ownership of the copyright, so it is illogical to impose the exact 
legal test for establishing an implied license.91 It follows that the licensee can 
                                                                                                                      
 86 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (stating that the copyright holder has the exclusive right to reproduce or 
authorize the reproduction of the work); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 2, at 1:1 (explaining the 
dual purpose of the Copyright Act is to reward creators while still encouraging the public’s access to 
copyrighted work). 
 87 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 63 (noting that PIC had the opportunity to constrict any subsequent 
sublicensing while negotiating the original license agreement with Sylvania); Effects Assocs. v. Co-
hen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that written agreements force parties to negotiate 
with one another, allowing them to clearly determine their respective rights). Even though some copy-
right owners have argued that they will lose full control of their work through implied sublicensing, 
courts can safeguard against this by applying the strict Effects Associates standard to test for an im-
plied sublicense. See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 63 (specifying that PIC could have limited or prohibited 
downstream sublicenses when negotiating with Sylvania); Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 (reasoning 
that written agreements force parties to explicitly determine their respective rights when negotiating). 
 88 See 2 PATRY, supra note 2, § 5:118 (defining a license as permission from the copyright owner 
to use the copyrighted work); see, e.g., Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 762 (7th Cir. 
2016) (stating that request, delivery, and intent must be established to infer an implied license); Falcon 
Enters., Inc. v. Publishers Serv., Inc., 438 F. App’x 579, 581 (9th Cir. 2011) (mem.) (concluding that 
an implied license existed where all three factors were not fully satisfied); Estate of Hevia v. Portrio 
Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2010) (stating that intent is the critical factor in establishing an im-
plied license). 
 89 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 62 (stating that strict adherence to the three-part test based on the con-
duct of the copyright owner would effectively make all implied sublicenses impossible); Sublicense, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (explaining that a sublicense grants some or all of a licen-
see’s rights onto a third party). 
 90 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 62 (reasoning that strictly requiring a relationship between the copy-
right owner and sublicensee does not make sense); Sublicense, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 2 (stating that a sublicensee’s rights are rooted in the licensee’s rights); see also Appellant’s 
Opening Brief, supra note 47, at 2 (arguing that a sublicensee inherently lacks a relationship with the 
licensor); Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 53, at 15 (characterizing a sublicense as a “downstream 
deal between [the] licensee and sublicensee”). 
 91 See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing 
Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007)) (stating that nonexclusive licensees have no owner-
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substitute for the copyright owner in any precipitating sublicense agreement.92 
Additionally, replacing the licensee for the copyright owner in this scenario 
does not frustrate the intent of the Copyright Act because, from the outset, the 
owner has the ability to dictate the terms of any subsequent sublicenses when 
creating the underlying license agreement.93 
C. Intent Cannot Serve as the Sole Benchmark for an Implied Sublicense 
Having concluded that implied sublicensing is legally possible when the 
licensee serves as a substitute for the copyright owner, the more complicated 
question of how to test for an implied sublicense remains.94 Intent is undenia-
bly the most important factor in establishing an implied sublicense, as implied 
licensing law stems from the contract law notion of inferring implied-in-fact 
                                                                                                                      
ship of the copyright); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (explaining that only an exclusive license transfers 
ownership rights). 
 92 See Interscope Recs. v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CV 10-1662, 2010 WL 11505708, at *3 (C.D. 
Cal. June 28, 2010) (stating that the existence of an implied license is a contract law question and, to 
answer this question, courts look to the conduct between the parties allegedly a part of the contract). 
See generally Charles Duan, Internet of Infringing Things: The Effect of Computer Interface Copy-
rights on Technology Standards, 45 RUTGERS COMPUT. & TECH. L.J. 1, 36 n.130 (2019) (noting that, 
generally, in cases where courts have found an implied license, the relevant parties were in privity); 
see also Monika I. Jasiewicz, Comment, Copyright Protection in an Opt-Out World: Implied License 
Doctrine and News Aggregators, 122 YALE L.J. 837, 845 (2012) (stating that courts commonly infer 
implied licenses “when there is a direct dealing between” the parties (emphasis added)). Privity is “the 
connection or relationship between two parties,” who have the same legal interest in the matter. Privi-
ty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (emphasis added). Sublicense agreements are relatively 
removed from the crux of the Copyright Act, which focuses on the copyrightability of a work, yet the 
issue of copyright infringement is still the central inquiry here, so any legal standard for an implied 
sublicense must respect the purpose of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(a)(5), 106(1), 501(a)–
(b) (stating that copyright protection covers photographs and violation of the exclusive right of the 
owner to copy or authorize copies of the work is an infringement of copyright for which a legal owner 
can institute action); PIC III, 953 F.3d at 63 (first citing Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 
137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017) (analyzing whether cheerleading uniforms could receive copyright pro-
tections); then citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58–60 (1884) (analyzing 
the copyrightability of photographs); and then citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 594 (1994) (assessing whether musical parodies were copyrightable)). 
 93 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (stating that the copyright holder has the exclusive right to reproduce or 
authorize the reproduction of the work in copies); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
1979, 1986 (2016) (stating that the Copyright Act’s goals seek to support the public’s use of the works 
while also rewarding the creators); PIC III, 953 F.3d at 63 (noting that PIC had the opportunity to 
control downstream sublicenses when negotiating the underlying license agreement with Sylvania); 
Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) (reasoning that written agreements 
force parties to spell out and clarify the terms of the deal). 
 94 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 58 (stating that the question of whether implied sublicensing is legally 
possible is an issue of first impression); supra notes 84–93 and accompanying text (concluding that 
copyright law allows for implied sublicensing and the relevant relationship to consider is between the 
licensee and sublicensee). 
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contracts through the parties’ mutual assent.95 Nevertheless, intent is a murky 
standard that requires courts to speculate as to the licensor’s mindset.96 It arises 
out of the assumption that the licensor’s acts are deliberate and can evoke the 
assent to a license.97 Yet, in the context of implied sublicenses, the licensee 
does not have ownership over the copyright, so it is illogical to impose the ex-
act requirements that establish an implied license onto an implied sublicense.98 
In licensing, the copyright licensor has ownership of the work and is incentiv-
ized to protect its copyright value, ensuring that the licensor will be vigilant in 
its conduct with potential licensees.99 This deliberate conduct can then serve as 
                                                                                                                      
 95 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 61 (stating that the touchstone for finding an implied license is intent); 
Afori, supra note 23, at 276–77 (discussing how copyright law imported the implied license doctrine 
from contract law); see also Interscope Recs. v. Time Warner, Inc., No. CV 10-1662, 2010 WL 
11505708, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2010) (stating that the issue of implied licensing is a contract law 
question). Implied-in-fact contracts are contracts that are inferred through the parties’ conduct. Im-
plied-in-Fact Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2. Despite explicating the singular 
importance of the intent element, the First Circuit still utilized the request and delivery elements by 
embedding them in its assessment of intent, indicating that these factors do play an important role in 
establishing an implied sublicense. See PIC I, 953 F.3d at 65–66 (indicating that the court considered 
Orgill requesting the photos and Sylvania delivering those photos as relevant facts in inferring intent). 
Because these factors were important points in the First Circuit’s assessment, they should not be dis-
regarded in any future cases assessing implied sublicensing. See id. (stating that the request and deliv-
ery of the photos helped establish intent). 
 96 See Craig P. Bloom, Note, Hangover Effect: May I See Your Tattoo, Please?, 31 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 435, 462 (2013) (stating that in attempting to establish intent, courts must speculate 
as to the licensor’s thought process). Although in 2019, in Nelson-Salabes v. Morningside Develop-
ment, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit listed three non-exhaustive factors that 
demonstrate intent, courts have alternatively found intent from other factors including the lack of an 
objection from the licensor. See Geophysical Serv., Inc. v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co., 784 
F. App’x 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (concluding that the copyright owner’s failure to ob-
ject to the purported licensees use of the work constituted its intent to license); Nelson-Salabes v. 
Morningside Dev., 284 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that courts look at the following factors 
when inferring an implied license: (1) whether there was a short-term or ongoing relationship between 
the parties; (2) whether there was a written contract that dictated the copyrighted work could only be 
used with the creator’s consent or involvement; and (3) whether the conduct of the creator during 
delivery or creation suggested that the material could be used without the creator’s consent or in-
volvement); see also Baisden v. I’m Ready Prods., Inc., 693 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
an implied license can arise from the licensor’s permission or lack of objection). 
 97 See Geophysical Serv., 784 F. App’x at 257 (inferring an implied license from the licensor’s 
lack of objection); Baisden, 693 F.3d at 500 (establishing that consent for an implied license can arise 
from the licensor’s permission or the absence of objection); Nelson-Salabes, 284 F.3d 505, 515 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (examining “the totality of the circumstances” framing the owner’s conduct). 
 98 See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining that exclusive licensees have 
ownership over the copyright); Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 983 F. Supp. 2d 338, 347 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (contrasting exclusive licenses with nonexclusive licenses and explaining that the 
latter do not transfer ownership); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (explaining that only an exclusive license 
transfers ownership rights). 
 99 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (stating that ownership of a copyright vests in the creator); Estate of Hevia 
v. Portrio Corp., 602 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2010) (reasoning that the owner created the work with the 
expectation that the licensee would use it); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 1, at 1:1 (indi-
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the exclusive benchmark of the intent to license.100 On the other hand, in a sub-
licensing situation, the licensee does not have ownership of the work and is not 
motivated to protect the property value of the copyright.101 Instead, the licen-
see may take a careless approach to interacting with the putative sublicensee, 
thereby easily establishing intent.102 Setting the legal standard to comport with 
the stringent three-part test would ensure that courts accurately interpret an 
implied sublicense only where the licensee intended to sublicense.103 
Furthermore, although adherence to the policies of the Copyright Act is 
critical, the issue of implied sublicensing is further removed from the crux of 
copyright law and requires a deeper dive into contract law.104 When consider-
ing copyright sublicensing in relation to contract law, the intent element’s 
                                                                                                                      
cating that Congress amended the Copyright Act with respect to the original owner’s desire to further 
safeguard their work). 
 100 See John G. Danielson, Inc. v. Winchester-Conant Props., Inc., 322 F.3d 26, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) 
(outlining the elements that could establish intent for an implied license). 
 101 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d) (stating that ownership of a copyright vests in the creator and it 
can be transferred through an exclusive license); Baisden, 693 F.3d at 500 (stating that permission or 
even lack of objection can establish an implied license). Furthermore, because the nonexclusive licen-
see lacks standing to sue on an infringement claim against a sublicensee, the licensee does not relin-
quish any infringement claims when sublicensing, providing even less of an incentive to protect the 
property value of the copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (limiting standing to sue in an infringement 
action to owners of exclusive rights or beneficial owners of those rights); Saregama India Ltd. v. Mos-
ley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a nonexclusive licensee did not have statutory 
standing to sue on a copyright infringement claim); Latin Am. Music Co. v. Archdiocese of San Juan, 
499 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the nonexclusive licensees could not bring a copyright 
infringement claim because they lacked standing). 
 102 See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a), (d) (establishing that the creator initially receives the rights to their 
creation and can transfer those rights through an exclusive license); Beastie Boys, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 
347 (concluding that a nonexclusive license allows the owner to retain ownership over the copyright); 
cf. Estate of Hevia, 602 F.3d at 43 (ruling that the owner granted an implied license because he creat-
ed the work in preparation for the licensee’s use). 
 103 See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 
(2d Cir. 2000) (stating that courts have inferred implied licenses “in ‘narrow’ circumstances” using the 
three-factor test (quoting Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 104 See Photographic Illustrator’s Corp. v. Orgill, Inc. (PIC III), 953 F.3d 56, 63 (1st Cir. 2020) 
(stating that sublicensing is further removed from the core of copyright law). Some scholars argue that 
implied license doctrine should stem from property law rather than the judge-imported contractual 
elements. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 23, at 504, 517 (arguing that implied licensing is rooted in 
property law, not contract law); David A. Dana & Nadav Shoked, Property’s Edges, 60. B.C. L. REV. 
753, 816 (2019) (noting that some scholars analogize copyright law to the trespass protections of 
property law). Nonetheless, if contractual remedies are available for licensing disputes, i.e., a copy-
right owner who grants a nonexclusive license has the right to sue the putative licensee for breach of 
contract, then contractual doctrine can serve as the basis for the formation of a sublicense when it does 
not conflict with the Copyright Act. See MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Ent., Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 
(9th Cir. 2010) (characterizing copyright licensing as sitting at the nexus of copyright and contract 
law); Ticketmaster L.L.C. v. Prestige Ent., Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1172 (C.D. Cal. 2018) (stating 
that a copyright holder who grants a nonexclusive license may sue for breach of contract). 
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greatest flaw is that it neglects to assess the mutuality of the agreement.105 Alt-
hough the delivery prong is insufficient by itself to establish an implied subli-
cense, delivery, combined with request, gets to the heart of mutuality.106 Spe-
cifically, request for the work from the sublicensee and delivery of the work by 
the licensee objectively show both parties’ assent to the sublicense.107 Incorpo-
rating the delivery and request elements into intent, as the First Circuit did in 
PIC III, misses the mutuality mark, but explicitly naming them as factors 
would ensure that courts do not overlook mutual intent.108 Ultimately, all three 
elements must be in place to truly evince an implied sublicense.109 
CONCLUSION 
The Copyright Act of 1976’s silence on the issue of sublicensing leaves 
an abundance of room for judge-made laws. Placed in such a situation, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Photographic Illustrators Inc. v. 
Orgill, Inc., sought guidance from cases discussing implied licensing in copy-
right law and properly held that implied sublicenses are legally possible. The 
court also properly tested for an implied sublicense by considering the rela-
                                                                                                                      
 105 Boryana Zeitz, Comment, “How High Is Up”: Interstitial Dilemmas in Nonexclusive Copy-
right Licensing Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 429, 447 (2004) (noting that “the 
intent element misses the mutuality of the agreement”); see also Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29, 47 
(1876) (stating that no contract can exist without mutual assent); Mutuality, BOUVIER’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY, supra note 5 (defining mutuality as a quid pro quo where each party receives either a “re-
ciprocal benefit or detriment”). Although consideration is a key component of contract formation, 
copyright law does not require it to transfer a copyright. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 23, 
§ 10.03 (stating that consideration is not necessary to execute a transfer of a copyright). See generally 
Consideration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2 (defining consideration as a bargained-for 
exchange between a promisor and promise). 
 106 See Zeitz, supra note 105, at 447 (observing that delivery, along with request, can indicate the 
parties’ mutual intent). 
 107 See id. (noting that the combination of request and delivery demonstrates mutual assent). Re-
quiring mutual assent in implied sublicense dovetails with the general notion that agreements should 
be written. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 (noting that “common sense tells us that agreements 
should routinely be put in writing”). By detailing the agreed-upon terms, a written agreement prevents 
many potential misunderstandings. Id. Although nonexclusive licenses and sublicenses need not be in 
writing, mutuality similarly eliminates many misunderstandings that may arise regarding the right to 
use the copyrighted work because both parties have to either affirmatively seek or give the work. See 
id. (indicating that by transcribing an agreement, parties can potentially prevent future misunderstand-
ings); Mutuality, BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (defining mutuality as a transaction 
between the parties). 
 108 See PIC III, 953 F.3d at 65–66 (ruling that intent alone establishes an implied sublicense); 
Zeitz, supra note 105, at 447 (suggesting that delivery and request get at the heart of mutuality). 
 109 See SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d 21, 25 
(2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “courts have found implied licenses only in ‘narrow’ circumstances” using 
the three-factor test (quoting Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558)); Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 558 (rea-
soning that nonexclusive licenses are “a narrow exception to the writing requirement” and can arise from 
a finding of delivery, request, and intent); Zeitz, supra note 105, at 447 (indicating that, together, deliv-
ery and request can demonstrate mutual assent). 
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tionship between the licensee and sublicensee. Although the First Circuit was 
correct in stating that the touchstone for implied sublicensing is intent, request 
and delivery are critical to the issue as well. Indeed, the stricter, modified 
three-element standard, which requires request, delivery, and intent, creates a 
framework that will ensure that the intent portrayed by the licensee is deliber-
ate and privity exists between the two parties to the sublicensing agreement. 
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